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Criminal Procedure
By RUTHEFORD B CAMPBELL, JR.*
INTRODUCTION
In 1974, the Kentucky Court of Appeals decided a number
of criminal procedure cases. Although these included cases in-
volving prisoners' rights,' probation revocation procedure, 2
and discovery, the more significant decisions were in the area
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.A. 1966, Centre College;
J.D. 1969, University of Kentucky; LL.M. 1971, Harvard University.
' In McGuffin v. Cowan, 505 S.W.2d 773 (Ky. 1974), the Court held that a prisoner
was not entitled to a hearing prior to his "good time" credits being taken from him.
This case would seem to be overruled by a subsequent Supreme Court case, Wolff v.
McDonnell, 94 S.Ct. 2963 (1974). In Harrison v. Robuck, 508 S.W.2d 767 (Ky. 1974)
the Court held that the Parole Board did not abuse its discretion by excluding counsel
at the hearing on Harrison's application for parole. The Court further held that the
Board did not abuse its discretion by not supplying Harrison with a statement of the
reason for the denial of his parole application.
2 In Reeder v. Commonwealth, 507 S.W.2d 491 (Ky. 1973) the Court of Appeals,
relying on Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973), held that Reeder had not been
entitled to a lawyer at his probation revocation hearing. In another case relying on
Gagnon, the Court held that the Johnson Circuit Court had not afforded appellant due
process when that court revoked his probation. Wells v. Webb, 511 S.W.2d 214 (Ky.
1974). Wells had been arrested on a probation-violation warrant and held in jail 40
days without a hearing of any kind. When Wells instituted a habeas corpus proceeding,
the judge denied his habeas corpus relief and then revoked his probation. The Court
of Appeals held this procedure did not meet the minimum standards of due process
under Gagnon. Specifically, defendant had no preliminary hearing and the final hear-
ing (the habeas corpus proceedings) did not meet the Gagnon requirements, because
appellant was not given notice of the claimed violation, the evidence against him was
not disclosed, and "he was not told in advance that the hearing would be on the issue
of probation violation, wherefore he was given no opportunity to be prepared or to
obtain evidence." Id. at 215.
In Roach v. Commonwealth, 507 S.W.2d 154 (Ky. 1974) a police officer had
testified from 35 pages of notes at Roach's trial. Relying on Kentucky Rule of Criminal
Procedure 7.26, Roach moved that these papers be turned over to him for examination.
The Court of Appeals held that any papers the Commonwealth refused to hand over
should have been examined by the trial court to determine whether Roach was entitled
to see the papers under Rule 7.26.
The Court of Appeals, in Byrd v. Commonwealth, 509 S.W.2d 261 (Ky. 1974), held
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it overruled defendant's motion
for discovery of a ballistics report and a motion to examine some articles of clothing
worn by an officer shot by the defendant, because neither the report nor the clothing
were introduced in evidence at the trial and because the defendant had an adequate
opportunity at the first trial to examine the clothing.
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of the right of effective assistance of counsel and the area of
search and seizure. It is to these latter two areas that the author
will limit his discussion.
I. RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL4
A defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel is
guaranteed by the United States Constitution.' In 1974 the
Kentucky Court of Appeals decided three cases that reflect the
Court's attitude to a defendant's claim that he was denied
effective assistance of counsel. Most significantly, the Court
affirmed that a defendant is denied effective counsel only if the
performance of the attorney is so poor as to amount to a farce
and a mockery of justice.'
In Lay v. Commonwealth7 appellant claimed that he had
been denied the effective assistance of counsel, basing his claim
on the ground that he was denied an appeal from his conviction
because his retained counsel did not "inform him of his rights
regarding indigent appeal." Although the Court emphasized
that there was substantial evidence that appellant had been
informed by his lawyer of his right to appeal, the Court appar-
ently determined that the failure to inform a defendant of the
right to appeal would not support a claim of ineffective counsel.
The Court stated:
In any event, appellant was chargeable with error of judg-
ment on the part of his retained counsel, unless it appears
that the efforts of retained counsel were such as to shock the
conscience of the Court or to render the proceedings a farce
and a mockery of justice. There is no evidence or allegation
of such conduct on the part of his counsel.'
For a more extensive discussion of this topic see Kentucky's Standard for Inef-
fective Counsel: A Farce and a Mockery ? in the Comments section of this issue.
' Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) ("duty [to appoint counsel for a
defendant] is not discharged by an assignment at such a time or under such circum-
stances as to preclude the giving of effective aid. . . ."); Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S.
85, 90 (1955) ("The effective assistance of counsel is a constitutional requirement of
due process which no member of the Union may disregard."); McMann v. Richardson,
397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) ("It has long been recognized that the right to counsel is
the right to the effective assistance of counsel.").
6 This is consistent with prior Kentucky cases. Berry v. Commonwealth, 490
S.W.2d 741 (Ky. 1973); Caples v. Commonwealth, 481 S.W.2d 675 (Ky. 1972).
7 506 S.W.2d 507 (Ky. 1974).
3 Id. at 508.
I Id. (citations omitted).
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In two other cases, however, appellants claiming ineffec-
tive counsel fared better. In Vaughan v. Commonwealth" the
appellant, who had been convicted of a drug violation, claimed
he was denied effective counsel, and the Court agreed. In up-
holding appellant's claim, the Court relied on two factors. One
factor was the inadequacy of the attorney's time to prepare the
case for trial. Appellant's attorney had conferred with him only
15 minutes before trial. 1 The second factor was the possible
conflict of interest of appellant's attorney, who was also repre-
senting another defendant. Resting its decision "primarily" on
these two factors, the Court held that "Vaughan was denied
effective assistance of counsel."
The Court in Vaughan also discussed the standard of effec-
tiveness for counsel. Although the court endorsed the "farce
and mockery" standard, it emphasized that this standard went
only to the "trial performance by the attorney and not to the
matter of time for preparation for trial."" The latter, therefore,
is an independent basis for a finding that counsel was ineffec-
tive. As the Court noted: "Our cases do not hold that the fail-
ure to allow an attorney adequate time for preparation for trial
is a ground for relief only if the attorney's conduct at trial is so
hopelessly bad as to make the trial a farce."' 4
Finally, the case of Maynard v. Commonwealth" is consis-
tent with the above two cases. In Maynard three defendants,
including Maynard, had been convicted of shooting into a
dwelling. At the lower court level a single attorney was ap-
pointed to represent all three of the defendants, even though
' 505 S.W.2d 768 (Ky. 1974).
,In Raisor v. Commonwealth, 278 S.W.2d 635 (Ky. 1955) the Court held that four
hours from the time of appointment to the time of trial was insufficient, where defen-
dant was charged with grand larceny.
12 Vaughan v. Commonwealth, 505 S.W.2d at 770. There were at least three other
factors that tended to make the effectiveness of counsel questionable. First, there was
apparently not an overwhelming amount of evidence against Vaughan. Second, de-
fense counsel did not object to the introduction of evidence obtained by a search of
questionable legality. Finally, because of confusion between Vaughan's attorneys,
Vaughan's appeal was not perfected.
"Id. at 771.
" Id. It is unclear what standard is applicable to the issue of time for preparation.
It would seem that an attorney should be permitted at least a period in which he can
reasonably prepare for the particular trial.
Is 507 S.W.2d 143 (Ky. 1974).
19751
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the attorney stated that he would be unable to adequately
represent all three because they had antagonistic defenses. The
Court of Appeals, relying again on the possible conflict of inter-
est of appellant's attorney to find a denial of the right to effec-
tive assistance of counsel, overturned Maynard's conviction
with the statement: "The court erred in not appointing sepa-
rate counsel to represent these co-defendants." 6
As may be expected, commentators have generally been
critical of the "farce and mockery" standard. They have
pointed out, for example, that the farce and mockery standard
"puts an unduly heavy burden on the defendant [and] . . .
is unduly vague and is therefore, unpredictable and difficult to
apply." Most commentators seem to favor a more demanding
standard of effectiveness, one which necessitates at least rea-
sonably competent representation. As one commentator has
stated: "It would seem that [the lawyer] must perform at least
as well as the lawyer with ordinary training and skill, conscien-
tiously protecting his client's interests."'" Additionally, and
perhaps in response to pressure from commentators, a number
of jurisdictions have rejected the "farce and mockery" stan-
dard in favor of a reasonableness test. 9
It is hard to defend continued adherence to the "farce and
mockery" standard as the appropriate measure of the effective-
ness of counsel. 2 As stated above, this standard is so vague that
" Id. at 144. As with the inadequacy of time problem, the fact that an attorney
was representing conflicting interests would seem to be an independent basis for hold-
ing counsel ineffective. Thus, relief would not be predicated on a finding that the trial
was a "farce," because a conflict problem would not go to "trial performance" and
accordingly would not be subject to the "farce and mockery" norm. Vaughan v. Com-
monwealth, 505 S.W.2d 768, 770 (Ky. 1974).
17 Finer, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 CoRNEa L. Rav. 1077, 1078 (1973).
11 Note, Effective Assistance of Counsel for the Indigent Defendant, 78 HIAv. L.
REv. 1434, 1435 (1965). For a similar formulation, see Lumbard, The Adequacy of
Lawyers Now in Criminal Practice, 47 J. AM. Jun. Soc'y 176, 178 (1964) ("the time
and attention which would be devoted to the case by the average criminal court lawyer
who receives reasonable minimum fee").
1, Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1974); Moore v. United States,
432 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1970); Scott v. United States, 427 F.2d 609 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Coles
v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1968); MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592 (5th Cir.
1960); In re Saunders, 472 P.2d 921, 926, 88 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1970); State v. Merchant,
271 A.2d 752, 755 (Md. App. 1970); State v. Thomas, 203 S.E.2d 445 (W. Va. 1974).
20 For a discussion of the reasons courts are reluctant to find counsel ineffective,
see Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CiN. L. Rav. 1, 22-28 (1973).
[Vol. 63
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it gives a court little help in deciding what factors make legal
representation ineffective. In a recent Sixth Circuit case, Judge
Celebrezze noted this objection to the standard: "The phrase
'farce and mockery' has no obvious intrinsic meaning. What
may appear a 'farce' to one court may seem a humdrum pro-
ceeding to another." 2'
The more critical problem, however, is the injustice a de-
fendant may suffer under the "farce and mockery" standard.
Effective legal representation is essential to a functioning ad-
versary system of justice. To require that representation meet
only the "farce and mockery" standard is to relegate the right
to counsel to meaningless words. Perhaps Judge Bazelon best
stated the problem when he wrote: "The 'mockery' test re-
quires such a minimal level of performance from counsel that
it is itself a mockery of the Sixth Amendment.""2
There is yet another very practical reason why the Ken-
tucky Court should reject the "farce and mockery" standard.
The Sixth Circuit has recently adopted a reasonableness test
as the measure of effective assistance of counsel. This means
that, as a practical matter, all defendants in Kentucky state
courts are entitled to reasonably effective representation.
In Beasley v. United States2l the petitioner, who had been
convicted in federal district court of attempted armed bank
robbery, filed a motion to vacate the sentence and judgment,
claiming that he had been denied effective assistance of coun-
sel. In sustaining petitioner's motion, the court rejected the
"farce and mockery" standard as the appropriate measure of
the "effectiveness" of counsel. Rather, the court stated: "We
hold that the assistance of counsel required under the Sixth
Amendment is counsel reasonably likely to render and render-
ing reasonably effective assistance. . . .Defense counsel must
perform at least as well as the lawyer with ordinary training
and skill in the criminal law. . .."24
1, Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 692 (6th Cir. 1974).
"Bazelon, supra note 20, at 28.
' 491 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1974).
24 Id. at 696. The court then went on to explicate some specific instances when an
attorney's performance would be ineffective under the reasonableness standard:
It is a violation of this standard for defense counsel to deprive a criminal
defendant of a substantial defense by his own ineffectiveness or incompet-
ence. Defense counsel. . . must conscientiously protect his client's interests,
19751
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Although it is not entirely clear that state courts are bound
to follow precedents of the federal district courts or the federal
circuit court of appeals,2 there is a procedure by which a defen-
dant can get the federal standard of "effectiveness" applied to
his situation. Under federal law, one convicted in a state court
can raise constitutional issues by making an application for a
writ of habeas corpus to certain federal courts or judges.26 Thus,
a defendant who has been convicted in Kentucky and who has
exhausted his remedies with respect to his claim of ineffective
counsel can have that issue adjudicated by a federal court, and
presumably the Sixth Circuit would apply its own standard of
effectiveness. This seems to be the position taken by the Sixth
Circuit in Berry v. Cowan.Y In that case, Berry, who had been
convicted in Kentucky state court of a drug violation, peti-
tioned the Western District of Kentucky for a writ of habeas
corpus. Although the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's
denial of the petition, it recognized that there was a discrep-
ancy between the standard of effectiveness in Kentucky and
the standard of effectiveness in the Sixth Circuit. Further, the
court indicated that, in determining whether to grant a petition
for habeas corpus, the Sixth Circuit would apply the standard
of reasonableness explicated in the Beasley case. Although the
Sixth Circuit found that the Kentucky Court of Appeals had
applied "the now abandoned test" of effectiveness, the denial
of the petition was affirmed because the conduct of counsel met
the more stringent reasonableness standard. The court de-
clared: "Since we conclude that the conduct of counsel met the
proper constitutional test, it is immaterial in our judgment
undeflected by conflicting considerations. Defense counsel must investigate
all apparently substantial defenses available to the defendant and must
assert them in a proper and timely manner.
It is a denial of the right to effective assistance of counsel for an attorney
to advise his client erroneously on a clear point of law if this advice leads to
the deprivation of his client's right to a fair trial.
Id. (citations omitted).
See, e.g., United States ex rel. Lawrence v. Woods, 432 F.2d 1072 (7th Cir.
1970). The court in Lawrence cites cases holding that state courts are bound to follow
the lower court decisions and cases holding that state courts are not so bound. See also
Annot., 147 A.L.R. 857 (1943); Note, Freeing State Courts to Disregard Lower Federal
Court Constitutional Holdings, 25 Sw. L.J. 478 (1971).
28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-55 (1970).
497 F.2d 1274 (6th Cir. 1974).
[Vol. 63
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that the conduc.t may also have met the test which is now
abandoned.
In light of the foregoing considerations it seems appropri-
ate for the Kentucky Court of Appeals to adopt the reasonable-
ness standard of Beasley. Such a decision would give substance
to the constitutional guarantee of effective counsel, as well as
prevent needless litigation in the federal courts. 29
II. SEARCH AND SEIZURE
A. Search Warrants
In 1974 the Court decided two cases dealing with the legiti-
macy of search warrants. In Rooker v. Commonwealth0 a
county judge issued a search warrant based on an affidavit
presented to him by a county sheriff. At the hearing on the
motion to suppress the evidence obtained under the warrant,
the issuing judge admitted that he had not read the affidavit
before issuing the warrant. As a result, the Court held that the
search was in violation of the State and Federal Constitutions,
stating:
Part of the protection of the Fourth Amendment consists of
requiring that inferences in determining probable cause be
drawn by a neutral and detached issuing authority instead of
the police or government agents. Where a judge issues a
search warrant based upon an affidavit which he does not
read, he makes no determination of probable cause but
merely serves as a rubber stamp for the police. Such action
is improper even though the affidavit actually shows proba-
ble cause .... A,
= Id. at 1276.
21 As noted supra, the Kentucky Court utilizes the "farce and mockery" standard
only as a measure of "trial performance." Vaughan v. Commonwealth, 505 S.W.2d 768,
771 (Ky. 1974). Thus where the question of effectiveness involves the lack of time for
preparation or a potential conflict, for example, the Court may be, sub silentio, apply-
ing a reasonableness standard. Under this standard a defendant would be denied
effective assistance of counsel if counsel's time for trial preparation was so brief as to
prevent a reasonable preparation for the particular case. Further, a defendant would
be denied effective assistance of counsel if his attorney, because of a conflict of interest,
was unable to provide him with reasonable representation.
31 508 S.W.2d 570 (Ky. 1974).
11 Id. at 571. (citations omitted). Not only was the warrant issued in violation of
the State and Federal Constitutions, but it also appears to have been in violation of
the Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.04.
19751
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
In Commonwealth v. Eilers2 the Court was faced with the
issue of whether the affidavit in support of a search warrant
established probable cause. The affidavit, submitted by Detec-
tive Wheat, was based on statements made to Wheat by Jef-
fries, a Special Assistant United States Attorney. The affidavit
stated that Jeffries had informed Wheat that a reliable
informant, who had given accurate information a number of
times before, had informed him (Jeffries) that Eilers was en-
gaged in illegal gambling activities. The informant had told
Jeffries that this conclusion was based on admissions made by
Eilers and on the informant's making of bets with Eilers. On
the basis of this information, a search warrant was issued. The
defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained under the
warrant because the warrant was based on "hearsay on hear-
say" and, therefore, did not meet the probable cause require-
ment. The Court upheld the search, holding that double hear-
say would not negate probable cause.
If properly applied, the rule emerging from Eilers is sound.
It has been previously established by the Supreme Court that
the rules of evidence are not applicable to the probable cause
determination." Further, hearsay can be considered in the issu-
ance of a warrant.3 Where, however, a warrant is based solely
on allegations of an informant, which are related to the court
by the affiant, the magistrate must be informed of some under-
lying circumstances from which the informant concluded that
a violation of the law had occurred, and the magistrate must
be informed of some of the underlying circumstances from
which the officer concluded that the informant was reliable.3 1
Thus, as the Court noted in Eilers, "[it is clear that the alle-
gations of the affidavit were sufficient to satisfy the require-
ments. . . had Jeffries made the affidavit instead of Wheat. '36
In Eilers, however, there was one additional link between the
informant and the court. The additional link was Jeffries. It
would seem appropriate, therefore, to require that the reliabil-
3? 503 S.W.2d 724 (Ky. 1973).
33 Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338
U.S. 160, 172-73 (1949).
31 United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965); Draper v. United States,
358 U.S. 307 (1959).
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964).
Commonwealth v. Eilers, 503 S.W.2d 724, 726 (1973).
[Vol. 63
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ity of the additional link (Jeffries) be established by demand-
ing that the magistrate be presented with facts and circum-
stances proving the credibility of Jeffries. This would seem
consistent with prior cases, which have demanded that sources
utilized by an affiant as a basis for a search warrant be de-
monstrably credible. Absent unusual circumstances, a pre-
sumption that a Special United States Attorney is reliable
would appear to be justified. In such a case, Eilers is sound,
especially in light of the fact that the Supreme Court has said
that the probable cause determination is a common sense, non-
technical determination."
B. Automobile Searches
In Scillion v. Commonwealth,3" the Kentucky Court up-
held a warrantless search of an automobile and in so doing
utilized a confused analysis that is not uncommon in similar
Kentucky cases.- In Scillion a police officer stopped an auto-
mobile driven by Cornwell. The officer arrested Cornwell for
having no driver's license, and he arrested Scillion for permit-
ting an unlicensed driver to operate Scillion's car." After both
men had been removed from the car and searched by the offi-
cer, the officer noticed a leather glove protruding from under
the seat of the car. He then conducted a warrantless search of
the automobile, which revealed incriminating evidence. Al-
though the Court of Appeals upheld the search as reasonable,
the justification for the warrantless search was less than clear.
At one point the Court quoted from a prior Kentucky case,
which stated that if an officer has probable cause to arrest the
occupants of an automobile, "he may place him or them under
arrest and may forthwith proceed to search the automobile
incident to the arrest."41 The Court was somewhat uncertain,
however, whether that rule would apply in Scillion, apparently
3 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949).
m 508 S.W.2d 307 (Ky. 1974).
31 See note 47 infra.
" The automobile was registered in the name of Scillion's wife.
" 508 S.W.2d at 308, quoting from Commonwealth v. Hagan, 464 S.W.2d 261, 264
(Ky. 1971).
1975]
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because the offense involved was not serious . 2 Nevertheless,
the Court was able to find an alternative basis for the warrant-
less search.43
In order for a warrantless search to be "reasonable," within
the meaning of the fourth amendment, it must fit within one
of the exceptions to the search warrant requirement." One such
exception is a search incident to a lawful arrest. The leading
case on this exception is Chimel v. California,45 in which the
Supreme Court explained the rationale for warrantless
searches incident to a lawful arrest in terms of protection of the
officer and prevention of the destruction of evidence by the
person arrested. Accordingly, the Court limited the scope of the
search incident to a lawful arrest to "the area 'within [the
arrested person's] immediate control'-construing that phrase
to mean the area from within which he might gain possession
of a weapon or destroy evidence."46 As the Supreme Court held
in a subsequent case, a search incident to a lawful arrest "must
. . . be confined to the area within the arrestee's reach at the
time of the arrest."47 The problem in Scillion was that the scope
of the search was not limited to the area described in Chimel.
In Scillion, the two men had "exited their vehicle" at the time
of the search of the car. Thus, it is difficult to justify the search
of the car by the need to protect the officer or to prevent the
destruction of evidence by the defendant. To the extent that
Scillion is based on the right of an officer to search incident to
a lawful arrest, it is unsound.48
The Court in Scillion, however, seemed to find an addi-
tional basis for sustaining the search. That justification was
,2 While the Court refused to characterize the offense as a "minor traffic viola-
tion," it stated that perhaps an arrest for the violations involved "alone would not
authorize a search of the automobile." 508 S.W.2d at 308.
,1 The alternative basis for the search was the "emergency" doctrine. See text
accompanying and sources cited in notes 48-56 infra.
" Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971); Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
395 U.S. 752 (1969).
Id. at 763.
4" Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 33 (1970).
" In both Ashcraft v. Commonwealth, 487 S.W.2d 892 (Ky. 1972) and Common-
wealth v. Hagan, 464 S.W.2d 261 (Ky. 1971), the Court used language that seems to
support the search of an entire automobile incident to a lawful arrest. It should be
pointed out, however, that it is not clear that Scillion is based on the search incident
to a lawful arrest exception.
[Vol. 63
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what has been referred to as the "emergency" or "exigent cir-
cumstances" doctrine. Under this rubric the Supreme Court
has developed an exception to the search warrant requirement
where there is probable cause to search and the delay involved
in obtaining a warrant threatens the loss of evidence.49 Since
the mobility of an automobile generally creates such exigent
circumstances, 0 the Supreme Court has permitted warrantless
searches of automobiles in order to prevent the loss of evidence,
if there is probable cause to search. Thus in Chambers v.
Maroney, 52 a case in which all four occupants of an automobile
were arrested on suspicion of robbery, the Supreme Court up-
held a warrantless search of an automobile because there was
probable cause to search and because the automobile "was a
fleeting target for a search. '53
Since the automobile in Scillion would also be a fleeting
target, the search would have been reasonable, if there had
been probable cause to search. The problem in Scillion, how-
ever, was the absence of facts sufficient to establish probable
cause. Probable cause to search requires facts that would lead
a man of reasonable caution to believe that seizable items will
be found in the place to be searched. 4 At the time of the search
the officer had seen "a leather glove protruding from under the
seat of the automobile; he knew that Scillion had dangerous
propensities; and he knew that on a previous occasion Scillion
had carried a weapon in his car."55 Based only on the above
information, it is unlikely that a man of reasonable caution
would believe that the automobile contained weapons. The
glove would seem to be no evidence of the presence of weapons.
Thus, the only evidence of weapons was the reputation of the
defendant .5  That should not have been enough, standing
" E.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
But see Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
, Cardwell v. Lewis, 94 S.Ct. 2464 (1974); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42
(1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
52 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
11 Id. at 52.
51 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1924). See also Comment, Search
and Seizure in the Supreme Court: Shadows on the Fourth Amendment, 28 U. Cm.
L. REv. 664, 687 (1961).
" Scillion v. Commonwealth, 508 S.W.2d 307, 308 (Ky. 1974).
" For a discussion of whether the reputation of a defendant can be considered in
determining whether there is probable cause, see Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S.
1975]
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alone, to establish probable cause. 7
Although the Court was wrong to permit the search in
Scillion, an equally disturbing aspect of the case was the lack
of precision in the analysis. Although the Court seemed to indi-
cate that a policeman can search an automobile anytime he
arrests the driver, the Court did not clarify its position on that
issue. Further, the Court's analysis of probable cause was at
best cavalier. There were virtually no facts supporting probable
cause. More fundamentally, the Court failed to make explicit
what the officer had probable cause to search for, although it
apparently was weapons. Such laxity in analysis is unbecoming
a Court which otherwise had a good year in the area of criminal
procedure.
410 (1969) ("assertion [that defendant was a known bookmaker] may [not] be used
to give additional weight to allegations that would otherwise be insufficient." Id. at
418-19); United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971) (plurality opinion) (a magistrate
or officer "may properly rely" on a "policeman's knowledge of a suspect's reputation
.. .in assessing the reliability of an informant's tip." Id. at 583).
*1 The lack of probable cause becomes even more apparent when one compares
Scullion to Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). In the latter case the Supreme
Court found no probable cause for a search warrant where the affidavit in support of
the warrant stated: (1) that the affiant "has been informed by a confidential reliable
informant that William Spinelli is operating a handbook and accepting wagers and
disseminating wagering information by means of the telephones which have been as-
signed the numbers WYdon 4-0029 and WYdon 4-0136"; (2) that Spinelli was a known
bookmaker and gambler; (3) that Spinelli had been seen going toward and entering
the apartment to be searched; and (4) that the apartment had phones corresponding
to the numbers given by the informant.
